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Abstract
Complex equality -  some notes on redistribution in South Africa
In this article I attempt to show that a theory o f redistribution can be derived from 
Walzer's political theory as presented in his Spheres o f  justice. I argue that this 
theory shows in what areas o f  South Africa’s public life redistribution is required, 
and what patterns o f redistribution should be followed Walzer’s political theory 
leans heavily on the notion o f shared understandings. In South Africa there are 
many areas o f public life in which interpretations o f these understandings are in 
conflict. I attempt to identify these areas and to show what premisses underlie the 
conflicting interpretations.
1. Stating the problem
Michael Walzer defends a system o f “complex equality” which has significance 
for attempts in S.A. to distribute social goods (including, and particularly 
income and wealth) equitably and fairly. Complex equality is a political 
dispensation governing the distribution o f  social goods in differentiated societies 
(i.e. societies which produce and distribute a large variety o f  social goods in 
accordance with culturally determined patterns o f  distribution). Complex 
equality is characterized by a strict equality o f  access to the social goods o f all 
spheres o f  society (moral and material) -  an equality which is maintained 
alongside different patterns o f  distribution for each sphere. This dispensation is 
designed to resist domination. To understand Walzer’s concept o f  domination 
we begin by accepting his distinction between monopoly and dominance. When 
someone or some group has a monopoly, they have control over the production 
and distribution o f  some social good. Dominance results when those who hold a 
monopoly use their control over the social good in question to gain control over 
other social goods. So, for instance, anyone who holds a monopoly o f state
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power could use this position to gain control over the means o f  production. 
Walzer believes that monopolies are in themselves not unjust; it is only when 
monopolies are used to aspire to positions o f dominance that unjust distributions 
arise. Under a system o f  complex equality, monopolies could grow within 
spheres, but no one could convert a monopoly in one sphere into control over the 
social goods o f  another sphere. But since the distribution o f  one social good will 
affect another in another sphere, there can, in practice, only be relative 
autonomy for spheres -  but even relative autonomy is, for Walzer, a critical 
principle o f  complex equality.
•  A sphere is absolutely autonomous only when the distributive pattern o f other 
spheres do not impinge upon it; a sphere is relatively autonomous only when an 
agent’s monopoly in one sphere does not give her a monopoly in another 
sphere (i.e. seepage and interpenetration between spheres do in fact occur, 
though this does not give any individual cross-boundary advantages).
Walzer thinks that monopolies cannot be prevented though dominance can. 
Systems o f  “simple equality”, which recognize an equality o f regard and/or 
outcome in various ways as the principles o f  fair distribution in all spheres of  
social life, attempt to deal with monopolies by outlawing them -  a move Walzer 
views as profoundly self-defeating. Rather than attacking monopoly, thinks 
Walzer, we should devise a social system which resists dominance.
Now, in South Africa a problem o f domination had manifested itself during the 
apartheid era. The white sector o f the population had thrived economically in part 
because they had control over the political sphere o f social life. And this situation 
has given them competitive advantage over other people in the current market. As 
I read Walzer, this historically gained advantage is unjust because it is due to 
boundary crossings between spheres, and to an exclusive admissions policy with 
regard to membership o f  the ‘South African’ community. Wealth gained because 
o f these things should be the subject o f redistribution, especially since the white 
sector o f the population still controls the greater share o f  the nation’s wealth.
I shall attempt to indicate that Walzer offers reasons why a redistribution should be 
carried out. According to Walzer historically gained advantages are unjust if due to 
exclusionary membership policies. As I shall attempt to show, the normative 
dimension o f  membership, taken together with an attempt to structure society in a 
way which resists domination -  particularly through the prohibition on boundary 
crossings between spheres -  require a redesign o f society if  advantages were 
accumulated because o f  domination. I shall attempt to exploit these points in 
making a case for redistribution.
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2. Walzer’s theory
Walzer defends a form o f communitarian pluralism. He attempts to reinteipret 
notions o f freedom and equality in an effort to construct a theory o f distribution 
suitable for multi-cultural societies (though he particularly has the USA in mind). 
His attempt at reinterpretation centres in three significant features o f his political 
theory:
•  In practice liberty and equality are best defended by separating the political 
sphere o f social life from all other spheres, in particular the economic sphere, 
and
• recognizing that each sphere has its own pattern or principle o f  distribution 
which conforms to the shared understandings o f the political community w ith in  
which the pattern is manifest;
•  each sphere functions autonomously, but the political sphere has an umbrella 
function -  it has to ensure that no distributive transgressions take place between 
spheres (eg. the fact that you are rich and I am poor does not give you any 
competitive advantage if  both o f us are running for public office).
Domination in social life is best combatted by maintaining the autonomy o f each 
sphere o f  distribution -  by preventing those who have great economic power from 
acquiring political power because they have economic clout, and vice versa; or by 
preventing those who have religious power from obtaining control over the sphere 
o f education because they have influence in the sphere o f religion. Since the 
boundaries between spheres reflect a cultural bias (where they are drawn may vary 
from society to society), the account o f justice which Walzer presents is ultimately 
a cultural account.
2.1 First principles and starting point 
Particularism and pluralism
The perspective or vantage point Walzer thinks is necessary for the acquisition of 
political knowledge is the shared understandings of one’s own society, and this is 
the perspective Walzer adopts in Spheres o f  justice (1983). Walzer identifies his 
starting point as particularist and pluralist. His particularist standpoint is inspired 
by his belief that principles o f  justice have to be based squarely on the shared 
understandings o f one’s own society. Walzer (1983:xiv) says he intends to “stand 
in the cave, in the city, on the ground” the goal being “to interpret to one’s fellow 
citizens the world o f meanings ... [they] share”. This approach contrasts with one 
in which theorists wish “to walk out o f the cave, leave the city, climb the 
mountain, fashion for oneself (what can never be fashioned for ordinary men and 
women) an objective and universal standpoint”.
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Walzer operates with two senses o f “pluralist”. One sense relates to the 
differentiation o f patterns o f distribution between the spheres o f justice in Walzer’s 
society (the USA). The second sense connects with the account o f “particularist” 
given above. Thigpen (1984:135) describes it as the “view that distributive 
principles are particular, not universal, that different principles are appropriate for 
different kinds o f societies”. This view o f (distributive) justice may be described as 
perspective-driven.
Justice can only be found from the vantage point of shared understandings
A comprehensive view o f society underwrites this very important principle. 
Human society is a “distributive community” (Walzer, 1983:3) i.e. a community in 
which people create goods (moral and material) which they share, divide and 
exchange, and in which distribution is the most significant vehicle or medium of  
social (interpersonal) relations. The goods of a community’s moral and material 
worlds (goods like rights, justice, equality, membership, work, leisure, education, 
honours) are social because their meanings are socially shared and defined and 
because they are conceived and created through social processes. No single set o f  
(primary) goods extends across all moral and material worlds, because the 
meaning o f  social goods are historical (the product o f  particular understandings 
built up over time) and relative (the social meanings that constitute goods can vary 
across time and space), and because different social processes lead to different 
understandings o f goods (i.e. how they should be distributed and for what reasons).
Relativism
Just how deep the relativism o f Walzer’s historical pluralism runs, may be gauged 
by the following consideration. Meaning and distribution are conceptually linked -  
to understand what a good means to the people for whom it is a good is to 
understand how the good in question is actually distributed in the community. 
Since social meanings are distinct, there must be a plurality o f social goods, and, in 
particular, a plurality o f lists o f  prim ary social goods which will differ from 
society to society. Differentiated societies, then, have distinctive social meanings 
with distinctive social goods. (In the case o f  the USA, Walzer mentions and 
discusses the following social goods: membership, security and welfare, money 
and commodities, office, hard work, free time, education, kinship and love, divine 
grace, recognition and political power). Each social good constitutes a distinct 
distributive sphere within which only certain (culturally biased) arrangements and 
criteria are appropriate. Given this the following become noteworthy:
•  the principles o f justice (for the USA and other differentiated societies) must be 
pluralistic:
D ifferent social goods ought to be distributed, for different reasons, in 
accordance w ith different procedures, by different agents; and ... all these 
differences derive from  different understandings o f  the social goods
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them selves -  the inevitable product o f  historical and cultural particularism 
(W alzer, 1983:6).
•  pluralism must be protected -  nobody should be allowed to convert a monopoly 
o f one social good into control o f another i.e. nobody should be allowed a 
position o f dominance. Walzer expresses this in the form o f a principle:
N o social good x should be distributed to m en and w om en who possess some 
other good y  m erely because they possess y  and w ithout regard to the 
m eaning o f  x (W alzer, 1983:20).
Walzer underwrites the idea o f a “pluralist” community which requires structures 
that unite all member communities by institutional bonds. In Walzer’s sense the 
good society is one in which a variety o f members (or partial) communities coexist 
in a form o f parallelism, all enjoying equal recognition, (constitutionally) 
guaranteed. The good community is more than just an association o f member 
groups, for they share an understanding o f what is public (o f concern to all 
members) and what is private (of concern to particular member groups) within a 
broad constitutional framework. This conforms to a basic principle o f political 
community: it is the understanding people share that makes them into a 
community and not just an association. The understanding they share -  in the 
“pluralist” sense -  is that there are matters o f public concern about which 
consensus must be established before any line o f political action can become 
possible. The roots o f political community is implicit in this idea: there are issues 
which anyone can legitimately take an interest in -  to the point o f censuring state 
conduct -  and this concerns the maintenance o f the separation between public and 
private, and the confinement o f state authority to the former. The line separating 
the domains will -  in any democratic society -  be open to negotiation in a public 
forum o f debate. So where the line is drawn is to a large extent a function of 
cultural particularism.
2.2 Shared understandings and common life
2.2.1 Political theorizing as interpretations of shared understandings 
The particular and the universal
Walzer’s approach to questions o f distributive justice is marked by a tension 
between the dues o f particularity and universality. The shared understandings of 
our common life underpin our principles o f  distribution. A society is just “if  its 
substantive life is lived ... in a way faithful to the shared understandings of the 
members ... [This means that] ... every substantive account o f distributive justice 
is a local account” (Walzer, 1983:313-314). For every community, argument “in 
matters o f morality, simply is ... appeal to common meanings” (Walzer, 1983:29). 
Yet, we do justice to all by “respecting their particular creations” (Walzer, 
1983:314). Justice requires a deep respect for the social meanings o f different 
peoples: justice “cannot require a radical redesign o f the village [community]
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against the shared understandings o f the members. If it did, justice itself would be 
tyrannical” (Walzer, 1983:313).
The principle of authoritive interpretation
Walzer’s comprehensive theory o f society attempts to pay all dues. For instance, 
he argues that in the USA the distributive logic o f the sphere o f security and 
welfare, need rather than the ability o f patients to pay, must be the operating 
principle. Walzer claims that his arguments are supported by polling data and that 
a majority opinion (a strong consensus) would justify a political practice. Bell 
(1993:63) interprets Walzer’s notion o f shared meaning an “an authoritative 
interpretation o f community morality that bears on the proper character o f the 
community”. There are two versions o f what counts as an “authoritative 
interpretation” o f community morality -  a strong and a weak one. Bell (1993:63 ff) 
affirms the weak version. The weak version requires
. . .  that there be substantial agreem ent about the m eaning o f  a social good (i.e. 
how  it should be distributed and for w hat reasons), that this agreem ent reflect the 
considered judgem ent o f  a  large m ajority o f  m em bers, and that there be general 
recognition that the good in question is consistent w ith the com m on good o f  the 
comm unity.
Walzer (1983:8) endorses a strong version. In addition to the above, it requires 
“that members affirm that their (moral) identity is affirmed by the community’s 
consensus regarding the value o f the good in question. ... Men and women take on 
concrete identities because o f  the way they conceive and create, and then possess 
and employ social goods”. If strong majorities show support for a certain 
interpretation o f a shared meaning, then that is strong evidence for the 
interpretation. Walzer thinks it is a virtue o f his approach -  keeping his nose close 
to the ground and interpreting to his fellow citizens their shared meanings -  that 
his arguments can be empirically evaluated.
A comprehensive theory of society
The drive towards universality is especially encouraged by Walzer’s reliance on a 
comprehensive theory o f  society. Critical standards aspire to universality -  yet 
they are in fact the product o f particularity. Critical standards are made available 
by the shared meanings o f  the community. This means that whenever a dissenter 
criticises a particular social practice, she is protesting in the name o f  the 
community itself (because it is unfaithful to its own self-understanding). She is 
appealing to a different interpretation o f  the meaning o f  the practice -  which 
interpretation may arise within the culture o f the community itself (immanent 
criticism), or may be borrowed from another culture (trans-acculturation). 
Substantive differences between interpretations o f the common good are 
encouraged by a culture o f  dialogue, but no appeal beyond the community itself 
can establish which interpretation will become dominant: that is a matter for the 
members themselves to decide.
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Walzer endorses the view that standards of criticism and rational justification are 
context bound, part o f the consciousness o f particular communities. He, however, 
thinks there are trans-communal grounds o f social critique which are part o f 
particular communities’ histories and traditions. In Interpretation and social 
criticism (1987) Walzer develops the idea of trans-communally shared 
prohibitions, which are “products o f many people talking o f real if  always 
tentative, intermittent and unfinished conversations. We might think o f them not as 
discovered or invented but rather as emergent prohibitions, the work o f many 
years, o f trial and error, o f  failed, partial and insecure understandings” (Walzer, 
1987:24).
The possibility o f a critique rooted in particularities yet having universal import 
proceeds from the convergence o f people’s understanding o f core moral 
propositions. Every society has prohibitions on things like murder, gross cruelty 
and torture. These are trans-cultural goods i.e. goods for all communities, whatever 
their cultural differences. It is possible to extract a core o f prohibitions from these 
goods and to ground morality on it. Dissenters’ criticism draws on this core to 
criticise fellow members o f their community, i.e. they draw on a world of shared 
meanings rooted in the social life o f human beings. For Walzer there is no court of 
appeal beyond the morality o f actual communities.
Referring to Walzer, Bell argues that dialogue aimed at securing consensus 
regarding shared prohibitions represents a gain in (moral) self-understanding. The 
test is simple enough: “ there can be progress from position x to position y if the 
transition from x to y can be shown to represent a gain in understanding, whereas a 
similarly plausible narrative o f a possible transition from y to x couldn’t be 
constructed” (Bell, 1993:76). And he continues (1993:77):
I imagine that a plausible narrative can be constructed to show that a transition 
from ... Nazi m orality ... to a m orality w hich prohibits gross cruelty represents 
m oral growth, w hereas this couldn’t be done the other w ay around. So even a 
G erm an brought up in a  culture whose ‘prevailing m oral beliefs and intuitions’ 
supported acts o f  gross cruelty against Jews, i f  she dem onstrated this 
asym m etrical relationship between the ‘prevailing m oral beliefs and intuitions’ o f 
her com m unity and another m orality w hich prohibits gross cruelty, m ight well 
condem n that part o f  her com m unity’s m orality w hich favours gross cruelty 
w ithout appealing to  an acontextual moral truth.
2.2.2 The common life as standard of judgement
If shared understandings express meanings (agreements about the distribution of 
social goods) which are accepted as just, how does a community rise to a critique 
of its own practices? Walzer (1983 and 1987) has suggested ways in which an 
immanent criticism is possible, but Walzer’s views go much deeper. Whether or 
not we think o f social meanings as just depends on how meanings are shared. 
Walzer argues that the proper attitude o f mind underlying any accord o f justice
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should be respect for “those deeper opinions that are the reflections in individual 
minds, shaped also by individual thought, o f the social meanings that constitute 
our common life” (Walzer, 1983:320).
If Walzer is right, a common life exists only if people share in shaping that life. So, 
if  shared values are not fully shared or imposed by domination, then a common life 
is indeed not possible. Downing and Thigpen (1986:457) reinforce this inter­
pretation. Walzer, they say, argues “that a common life may deserve more or less 
respect and that the appropriate degree o f respect should be determined by inquiry 
into the origin o f social meanings”. For a genuine common life to exist, members 
of a community must share in creating the social meanings. The communality o f a 
given social order depends on its inclusiveness. Membership, as Walzer argues, is 
the first condition o f  participation in the creation o f the commonality, and it must 
therefore be distributed equally. Downing and Thigpen (1986:417) formulate the 
critical edge that this gives to social criticism as follows:
The concept o f  the com m on life ... becom es a standard when a criterion justifying 
respect for shared understandings is introduced. This standard o f  judgem ent can 
be applied ... by citizens who have assum ed that they share a com m on life. Their 
discovery o f  form s o f  dom ination that exclude them  from the com m on life should 
lead them  (w ithout resort to an external vantage point) to criticize their society.
It is crucial to note that the potential for dissent is built into the very fabric o f the 
society Walzer presents. The different (autonomous) spheres o f distribution, each 
with its own appropriate principles or pattern o f distribution, form the public 
domain o f a differentiated society. The political sphere is charged with the task of 
policing boundary transgressions i.e. with the task o f resisting and eliminating 
areas where domination may grow up. So, if  prevailing understandings perpetuate 
a way o f  life that was institutionalized through domination, the distribution of 
power in that society has to be challenged, for such a distribution precludes the 
genuine sharing o f a common life. If a people are to have a common life, the story 
of their culture must be one which everybody authors. Downing and Thigpen 
(1986:459) identify the sense in which equality o f participation defines Walzer’s 
idea o f  the good society.
[W alzer’s] good society involves not sim ply equality o f  resources and social 
goods, but also equality o f  participation according to the criterion o f  pluralist 
citizenship, w here citizens share in determ ining the m eanings, values, and 
distributive principles for various social goods.
But this freedom to participate can be realized only if the spheres are (relatively) 
autonomous. Walzer’s society can be called good -  and just -  only if social life in 
each sphere is governed by the appropriate pattern or principle o f  distribution. The 
political sphere has a special status; it has one proper role -  to maintain the 
boundaries between other spheres and between itself and the others. An equality of 
consideration (though not o f outcome) prevails within each sphere: equal citizen­
ship means that members o f a community receive equal consideration within each
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sphere with respect to the distributive principles which govern these spheres. This 
amounts to a guarantee o f an equality o f opportunity (a logical outcome of an 
equality o f regard or consideration) within each sphere, which in turn amounts to a 
formal guarantee o f equal liberty for all.
The common life as normative standard
Walzer’s concept o f  the common life serves as a standard or norm against which 
the acceptability o f  moral/political actions are measured. If Downing and Thigpen 
(1986:417) are right, Walzer’s community has a (developed) common life only to 
the extent that all have a share in shaping its commonality. Membership o f the 
community is premissed on the recognition o f all members as contributors to the 
shape that the culture o f the community takes, i.e. it is premissed on the 
recognition o f  each member as a “culture-creating” creature. This idea of equality 
is constitutive o f the inclusiveness o f the common life. Domination o f one group 
or class by another (in virtue o f the dominant group’s or class’s control o f some 
social goods, e.g. money or the means o f production) works against inclusiveness 
in the sense that the dominated group or class receives less recognition than its 
peers in the sphere in which it is dominated (e.g. in education or housing). 
Domination is a ground for a critique o f shared understandings, and, ultimately a 
critique o f the unequal power relations which underpin those understandings. The 
inclusiveness o f the common life, then, requires that asymmetrical power 
distributions be corrected.
According to Downing and Thigpen (1986:459) the concept o f the common life, 
normatively understood, provides a basis for a critique o f  the abuse o f political 
power, and so serves as a principle o f legitimation. A pattern o f  distribution is 
legitimate if  it accords with the social meaning o f the good being distributed. 
Whoever controls power in the political sphere cannot, without injustice, use this 
power to determine the social meanings and patterns o f  distribution o f the social 
goods in other spheres. It could, then, not be possible for those who have political 
power to determine the distribution of the social goods in disregard o f the common 
understandings and social meanings which underpin their patterns o f distribution. 
The separation o f spheres and their (relative) autonomy, then, offers protection of 
equality o f participation and o f access to opportunity. The common life offers 
protection from domination because it is a protected sphere within which 
individuals can make uncoerced choices. An uncoerced choice is a choice made 
internal to a cultural structure. It is a choice made available by a culturally 
specified range o f options. This includes the choice o f a way o f life. The good life 
is a conception developed collectively and persons understand their own good by 
participating in the creation o f the commonality, which means a person’s good 
cannot be determined singly by the individual alone in isolation from the social 
context in which she operates. The crucial point is that the common good remains 
overriding: no individual’s good can trump or negate it.
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The principle of need as principle of redistribution
Now recall a point made earlier on. We said that a society is just if  its common life 
is lived faithful to the common understanding o f the members. By itself this 
criterion o f justice can be used to legitimise societies in which social goods are 
hierarchically structured. Should justice require a radical redesign o f  such 
societies? Here we note the following.
•  First, for Walzer actual distributions are regulated by a community’s resources. 
These resources are the past and present products o f the community, the 
accumulated wealth o f its members, and not some surplus portion o f that 
wealth. If any group has been excluded from participation in the production and 
accumulation o f  wealth (perhaps because a hierarchical structure has grown up 
through the institutionalization o f domination) it is just (fair) for them to 
demand a re-design o f the sphere o f income and wealth.
•  Second, in the case o f  needed goods, communal provision opens the door to 
communal participation. Communal participation is one very important 
guarantee o f the equal membership o f  all members. The significant feature 
about communal provision based on need (as in the Walzer’s sphere o f  security 
and welfare) is that it is redistributive in nature. This means that wherever need 
applies as a principle o f distribution (as in a society’s primary list o f basic 
needs) the accumulated wealth o f  a community should be distributed in 
accordance with the needs o f individuals. Any good in the list o f basic needs 
not distributed as indicated, constitutes an area o f  unfair treatment and requires 
a redesign o f  the sphere o f distribution. If we interpret the common life as the 
arena in which need determines the pattern o f distribution o f a community’s 
resources, we arrive at one o f the most significant attributes o f  Walzer’s 
community: (re)distribution creates a union -  a sense o f community -  that 
transcends all differences o f interest. In such a society debates about communal 
provision are, as Walzer notes (1983:12), at bottom, interpretations o f this 
union.
Membership and protection against domination guarantees only an equality of 
access to opportunity and participation -  not an equality o f  outcome. The 
difference is significant for our understanding o f the normative dimensions of 
community. Communal provision in the sphere o f needed goods is the most 
significant area in which redistribution is a requirement o f justice. The re­
distribution o f needed goods -  goods like work, housing and education -  will 
award greater shares to those who are more needy. Redistribution in this area will 
create the need for redistribution in other areas, for instance, in the sphere of 
income and wealth, but only if historical injustices have prevailed in the latter, 
injustices which have their genesis in exclusive admissions and membership 
policies, and in the failure o f the political arm to protect certain groups from 
domination.
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3. The justifiability of redistribution in South Africa
Walzer’s concept o f the common life is crucial to the case for redistribution. An 
inclusive membership policy receives priority because members’ status as equals 
qualifies them for equal consideration in each sphere in terms o f the distributive 
patterns o f each. The existence o f a common life with borders between spheres and 
between different communities o f character which political institutions protect is 
critical to W ater's vision o f  the plural state. “W ithout... [borders], there couldn’t 
be communities o f  character, historically stable, ongoing associations o f men and 
women with some special commitment to one another and some special sense of  
their common life” (Walzer, 1983:62).
Communitarian society: the principles of provision, recognition and ega­
litarian reciprocity
Membership o f the political community is important because o f what members 
owe one another “and the first thing they owe is the communal provision of 
security and welfare” (Walzer, 1983:64). For each community o f character the 
common life is the fundamental standard. This standard prohibits the exclusion of 
community members o f character from participation in the common life o f society 
at large: “the process o f self-determination through which a democratic state 
shapes its internal life must be open, and equally open, to all those men and 
women who live within its territory, work in the local economy, and are subject to 
local law” (Walzer, 1983:60).
If there is to be a genuine community o f citizens, then everyone within the political 
community -  whatever their attachments to other historical/traditional communi­
ties may be -  must be able to exercise full political rights. Walzer singles out 
“guest worker” policies in the European democracies for attention. If these coun­
tries are to be true to their basic understanding o f themselves as democracies, they 
must abandon policies which violate this understanding. A  similar imperative 
applied to South Africa. The exclusion o f black people from certain territory in 
South Africa (under the Land Act o f 1913), and their exclusion from central 
business districts in the main metropolitan areas, could not -  if  Walzer is right -  be 
justified with reference to the protection o f communities o f character, for a 
political community exists “for the sake o f  provision, provision for the sake of 
community: the process works both ways, and that is perhaps its crucial feature” 
(Walzer, 1983:64). Exclusion conflicts with the principle o f  provision: white 
control o f the economic sphere reduced black people to the status o f “guest 
workers” in territory reserved exclusively for whites (under the so-called “migrant 
labour” system) in which they enjoyed no rights to political representation.
The principle o f  provision rests on the principle o f  egalitarian reciprocity, which is 
the foundation o f an inclusive common life.
Every political com m unity m ust attend to the needs o f  its m em bers as they
collectively understand those needs ... the goods that are distributed m ust be
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distributed in proportion to need, and ... the distribution m ust recognize and 
uphold the underlying equality o f  m em bership (W alzer, 1983:84).
Witness how the distribution o f hard work -  a basic or primary good -  provides a 
good example o f  the social critique generated by the common life standard. Hard 
work as a social good is largely distributed by the market, which, because o f the 
common life standard, requires that work be available to all, and that no work be 
treated as degrading. In apartheid S.A, gruelling/dirty work was distributed as a 
negative good which degraded black people and barred them from the right to 
share in the common life. Walzer’s emphasis on the distribution o f hard work as a 
needed good is part o f the emphasis he places on the need for all to participate in 
the common life and hence to be full members o f  the community. In this regard 
Downing and Thigpen (1986:468) note that the “integrity o f  the common life ... 
constitutes a standard for the distribution o f hard work”. It is not difficult to see 
that Walzer succeeds in addressing the historical problem o f disadvantage due to 
exclusion and dominance (boundary crossings). And it is not difficult to see that a 
theory justifying redistribution in cases o f historical injustice can be derived from 
Walzer’s views. Walzer’s comprehensive theory o f the common life endorses the 
idea o f community understood as (re) distributive in nature. In what follows 1 
attempt to show in what ways current South African conditions are susceptible to 
critique from Walzer.
3.1 Redistributing social goods in contemporary South Africa
We must bear in mind Walzer’s avowed aim to formulate principles o f distribution 
which can be used to criticize practice, should practice be at variance with self­
understanding. Bearing in mind that different societies have different lists o f  basic 
or primary goods, the distributive principles currently operative in South Africa are 
plural -  different principles are recognized for different spheres -  though they are 
not always consistent with current self-understandings.
Recognition of difference in South Africa
Membership o f the political community is currently guaranteed for every member 
o f a community o f  character. To this extent the political community has 
experienced a redesign. But though the principle o f pluralism has been entrenched 
in the constitution -  both as a principle o f distribution based on need in critical 
areas o f  the common life (such as health care), and as a strategy for playing the 
politics o f  recognition (this principle recognizes cultural diversity), communities of 
character are given recognition only as linguistic communities, and no specific 
group rights exist which protect their cultural life. The absence o f  the latter is no 
doubt due to the racist legacy o f enforced group membership. This legacy is 
unfortunate since redistribution requires recognition o f  difference. Recognition of 
communities o f character is crucial to the social critique which Walzer mounts in 
two senses: the boundaries between spheres and the principles o f  distribution 
appropiate to them are judged in terms o f  the goal o f a common life which answers
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to a specific self-understanding; the moral acceptability o f patterns o f distribution 
depends on the way in which shared values are generated, and in this regard a 
strict equality with repect to membership is decisive.
Croup rights
What do South African citizens owe one another if they are to have an inclusive 
common life? At minimum they owe one another recognition o f who they are and 
where they come from. And this requires protection o f  groups per se against the 
assimilationist tendencies o f dominant cultures. In Spheres o f  Justice Walzer is not 
explicit on this point. I thus turn to the views o f a Walzerian-minded thinker -  M. 
McDonald -  to show what is involved here. If redistribution is to make a 
substantive difference we should begin by distinguishing between “a group’s 
having a right [specifically pertaining to language and education] and its members 
having that right” (McDonald, 1991:218). Following McDonald, a group right 
protects interests which are not severable into individual interests -  interests whose 
protection benefit a group itself by providing a collective benefit. So, for example, 
protecting a group’s right to be educated in their mother language is a right whose 
protection issues in a collective benefit; the right itself applies to an identifiable 
group, and though particular individuals are beneficiaries, they are not right­
holders; rather the group is the holder. This means that group rights involve a 
collective exercise (individuals exercise it on behalf o f their group). The idea of a 
collective exercise and benefit implies that the group, as right-holder, has a 
normative dimension which is largely a function o f  shared understandings.
M em bers ... see them selves as norm atively bound to each other such that each 
does not act sim ply for herself o r h im self but each plays her o r his part in 
effectuating the shared norm ative understanding ... That there is such shared 
understanding is a m atter o f  social fact and not m erely a  m atter o f  legal 
assignm ent o r ascription (M cDonald, 1991:218-219).
The crucial criterion o f  being a group, and thus qualifying for group rights, is “a 
group-constituting understanding” (McDonald, 1991:219). Such an understanding 
is paradigmatically correlated to features like a shared heritage, language, belief, 
and social condition. People oppressed because o f their ethnicity, race, or language 
provide a focus for a shared understanding. Deborah James (1997:123) observes in 
this regard that “experiences o f domination and resistance in the colonial and 
apartheid eras ... have served as a basis for local identity-building in the present 
day”. Let us call a group which has a “group-constituting understanding” an 
identifying community. Allegiance to an identifying community structures personal 
identity (at least, and minimally, partially) yielding content-fiill selves. In h igh ly  
pluralistic contexts (for instance, South Africa), the self-identification o f content- 
full selves is non-voluntary and unchosen, at least initially -  we identify with the 
identifying communities into which we are bom. Voluntary identification comes 
later (the consequence, no doubt, o f trans-acculturation), once we have acquired 
the necessary critical tools to make informed choices.
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As indicated above, with collective rights the community is the right-holder, which 
means that the community has moral standing, it defines the moral point o f view in 
respect of rights pertaining to language and education. We should here distinguish 
between two separate moral contexts: the first is defined by a group-constituting 
understanding that makes an association into a community; the second is defined 
by the larger, pluralistic context in which one community stands as right-holder 
vis-á-vis another. In this second context collective rights pertaining to language 
and mother-tongue instruction should be equally available, i.e. equality should be 
the principle o f distribution because this is required by the demand to redistribute 
recognition. But education is recognized as a needed good, and since rights to it 
are distributed according to need, historical injustices are corrected by awarding 
greater shares o f  the common wealth to the more needy. This means that former 
“black” schools in the former “black” territories have first claim on the public 
revenue, a claim clearly underscored by the demand for a redistribution of 
recognition. Collective rights essentially establish normative limits on the use of 
state power, and amounts to a guarantee o f  the identities o f the various 
communities that make up the plurality o f the state. To be a collective right-holder 
“contextually implies a certain confrontational stance” (McDonald, 1991:226) 
reminiscent o f  the understandings that are operative among indigenous peoples 
who have been confronted by aggressive and technologically advanced societies. 
A confrontational stance is attitudinal and not prepositional, yet it is possible to 
discern a supporting justificatory thesis. According to this thesis group or 
collective rights protect “both interests and activities that cannot be otherwise 
protected. The interests that are protected are inherently collective or social 
interests, in particular the interest that human beings have in belonging to 
nurturing, identifying cultural groups” (McDonald, 1991:229).
Mandela’s natural rights theory
Mandela’s political philosophy, however, makes provision only for individual 
rights (Kalumba, 1995:161), in the sense in which natural rights theory defends 
them. An adequate view o f this sense is given by Raz (1984:194). We can say 
some person x “has a right if and only if  x can have rights, and other things being 
equal, an aspect o f  x ’s well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding 
some other person(s) to be under a duty”. O f course, for someone to have a right in 
this sense, his or her well-being will have intrinsic worth, considered as an “end- 
in-itself ’ (in the Kantian sense o f requiring no further justification). An example of 
a right of this kind is the right to freedom o f expression, which implies a 
corresponding obligation: holders o f  the right may not deny anyone freedom of 
expression, and no one has the authority to deny the rights-holder a similar (equal) 
freedom. All rights in the sense given above are said to ground duties, i.e, “x ’s 
possessing a right to P provides a reason for holding Y to be under an obligation, 
all other things being equal”. Compare this view with the “reciprocity thesis” 
which Walzer defends. Walzer’s emphasis on the particularity o f  (cultural) 
accounts o f  justice implies that rights are entitlements which must have
54 Koers 64(1) 1999:41-64
Pieter Coe/zee
institutional or social recognition to be claimed as entitlements. We have rights 
because we are members o f (various) communities, but according to Mandela 
(Kalumba, 1995:162-164), rights are a fundamental feature o f  morality in the sense 
of being underived from any other (ultimate) interests, i.e. they are underived from 
our interest in being members o f nurturing, identifying communities, so there can 
be no differences in what rights are accorded persons across communities. 
Mandela recognizes negative and positive rights (Kalumba, 1995:162). Among 
negative rights, the basic ones comprise rights to life, liberty and justly acquired 
property; they are negative because the obligations that attach to them are those of 
non-interference (eg. the obligation not to kill others). Negative rights entail a 
certain view o f the state: the role o f the state tends to be defined in negative terms : 
the state is a mere umpire whose task is limited to securing non-interference in 
people’s enjoyment o f their negative rights. Positive rights call for obligations of 
provision, the necessities o f life such as food, shelter and health care. Their 
recognition requires that the state assumes a bigger role: in addition to protecting 
basic negative rights, it has to implement basic positive rights as well -  a role 
which may lead to it interfering with some people’s basic negative rights.
Mandela’s fundamental commitment -  as judged from the Freedom Charter -  puts 
him in the positive rights camp. The Freedom Charter includes rights demands 
which belong to the negative camp, but it also incorporates the basic necessities o f  
life as rights. The right to being decently housed, the right o f  all to bring up their 
families in comfort and security, the right to be fed and to medical care are seen as 
entitlements which must receive a special emphasis and focus. Consider the terms 
in which Mandela phrases the ANC’s demands: “a better health system which 
caters for all is not a privilege, but a right which must be guaranteed” (Mandela, 
1995:53). “All communities have a right to housing” (Mandela, 1993:8-9). 
“Nationalization o f  mines, banks, and monopoly industry ... is a prerequisite o f a 
fair distribution o f wealth” (Mandela, 1995:173). The Freedom Charter does not 
call for the wholesale nationalization o f business firms though it regards 
nationalization as an indispensable means for realizing the demands o f the Charter.
It is true that in dem anding the nationalization o f  the banks, the gold mines, and 
the land, the C harter strikes a fatal blow  at the financial and gold-mining 
m onopolies and farm ing interests that have for centuries plundered the country 
and condem ned its people to servitude. But such a step is im perative because the 
realization o f  the C harter is inconceivable, in fact impossible, unless and until 
these m onopolies are sm ashed and the national wealth o f  the country turned over 
to the people (M andela, 1995:55).
But this is a matter o f strategy rather than o f principle. The ANC has “no 
ideological attachment to nationalization, but it’s the only effective way to ensure 
an equal distribution o f wealth. We say to the business community: if  you have a 
better alternative tell us and if it’s effective w e’ll abandon nationalization” 
(McCarton, 1991:11).
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Nationalization is a weapon o f the straggle.
The A N C  has no blueprint that decrees that these or o ther assets will be 
nationalized, o r that such nationalization w ould take this o r the other form. But 
we do say that this option should also be part o f  the ongoing debate, subject to 
critical analysis as any other and view ed in the context o f  the realities o f  South 
A frican society (M andela, 1990:2-63).
For Mandela, positive rights o f provision are the ends to which nationalization is 
subordinate as the means (to overcome gross inequalities o f wealth and rights 
between the races). Situated in the context o f apartheid’s inequalities, Mandela 
sees no alternative way o f improving the situation o f  the disadvantaged majority 
short o f  tampering with private ownership o f  the means o f production -  the idea 
being to acquire the means to implement basic positive rights for the majority. 
Neither the call for positive rights o f provision nor the strategy to implement the 
call sees rights as founded in cultural communities.
Need: the argument for group recognition
Kymlicka (1989:903) argues that once we recognize the importance o f the cultural 
structure and accept that there is a positive duty on the state to protect the cultural 
conditions which allow for informed choice, then cultural membership does have 
political salience. Becoming an informed chooser requires an identifying group 
(the context in which one acquires an identity) and recognition o f one’s language 
and culture. (Penalization and non-recognition result in marginalization and create 
barriers to the growth o f  autonomy.) Language and culture are, however, collective 
assets; their protection is best vested in identifying groups themselves. Individual 
rights alone are inadequate for the job in hand since they provide no protection 
against assimilation and negative modes o f othering persons who are not members 
o f the dominant group(s). Hence the need for collective rights to provide 
protection o f  the linguistic and cultural heritage o f  the members o f distinct 
(minority) groups.
Iris Young (1990:45) explains marginalization as “structural and institutional 
relations that delimit people’s material lives, including, but not restricted to, the 
resources they have access to and the concrete opportunities they have or do not 
have to develop and exercise their capacities”. To experience cultural imperialism 
means “to experience how the dominant meanings o f  a society render the 
particular perspective o f one’s own group invisible at the same time as they 
stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other” (Young, 1990:58-59). 
Cultural imperialism succeeds to the extent that a dominant group succeeds in 
bringing the other groups under the measure o f  their dominant norms (Young, 
1990:59), thus disrupting and undermining other historical/traditional groupings, 
leaving individuals without other significant attachments or memberships. The net 
effect is one o f  disempowerment which impoverishes their very sense o f agency.
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Only a politics o f  difference, which involves recognition o f collective rights, can 
resist dominance and ensure a fair distribution o f rights to language and education.
Besides the right to (mother-tongue) education, which has become a justified area 
of redistribution, there have been initiatives to identify health/medical care as a 
social good which must be distributed according to need (i.e. medical care should 
be available to all who need it irrespective o f their ability to pay for it). And the 
motivation for this move springs from the recognition that a group identification of 
a kind is necessary, if only to justify a policy o f differential awards. Walzer sees 
the justification as proceeding from communal interests, because “communal 
funds are spent... to finance research, build hospitals, and pay the fees o f doctors 
in private practice, the services that these expenditures underwrite must be equally 
available to all citizens” (Walzer, 1983:90), i.e. in accordance with their needs. 
Walzer is careful to point out that a rich society which leaves provision of medical 
care to the free market is not necessarily unjust -  the wealth o f communities may 
be spent on “the cure o f souls, not o f bodies, or on defense, or drama, or 
education” (Walzer, 1983:44) as determined by the self-understandings o f the 
relevant communities. Their priorities cannot be philosophically determined -  only 
empirical research can establish that.
In South Africa justification follows lines consistent with Walzer’s overall views 
that “whenever the purpose o f communal provision is to open the way to 
communal participation, it will make sense to recommend a form o f provision that 
is the same for all the members” (Walzer, 1983:78). The common life is a standard 
by which to judge social practices and communal provision o f the kind in question 
and, as Downing and Thigpen (1986:463) put it, “bring citizens a heightened sense 
that they share a common life”. In other words -  failure to guarantee medical care 
in proportion to need constitutes evidence that the common life is poorly realized. 
We might argue that medical care is a social good in itself, and, following 
Downing and Thigpen (1986:402) maintain that all societies (rich and poor) 
should distribute this good in proportion to need. The grounds would be that 
modem medicine is a highly developed good which evolved through increased 
knowledge and technical competence and that all societies (especially rich, 
differentiated ones) place a high value on life and health, but this is not how this 
good is valued in South Africa.
3.2 Other areas of justifiable redistribution 
Public office
Two other social goods, viz. public office and housing (among other commodities) 
should be redistributed according to principles currently being debated in South 
Africa. Following Walzer a public office is “any position in which the political 
community as a whole takes an interest, choosing the person who holds it or 
regulating the procedures by which he is chosen” (Walzer, 1983:129). Thigpen
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(1984:147-148) argues that Walzer’s defence o f complex equality “would check 
the universalization o f office, as our [USA] values do not support the control o f 
society by those who qualify according to whatever standards happen to be 
dominant”. The acceptability o f this view, as Thigpen (1984:148) points out, 
depends on Walzer’s distinction between qualification and desert.
W alzer show s ... that qualification and desert are distinct concepts. Desert 
presupposes a  strict entitlem ent that depends on som ething one has done. Unlike 
desert, w hich is backward-looking, qualifications are forward-looking. They 
depend on policy choices about the characteristics ofpersons that are needed for 
future performance in particular positions.
In South Africa decisions to distribute public office in accordance with population 
demographics qualify as such policy decisions. Decisions pertaining to in-service 
training for blacks aspiring to entrepreneurial positions in the large corporations is 
another case in point. The policy choices at issue here are again an expression of  
the demand for a redistribution o f  recognition. Walzer’s concern, it should be 
remembered, is to secure an equality o f participation rather than an equality of 
outcome, which means that these policy choices are aimed at securing the desired 
equality o f participation.
Housing
A similar line o f  reasoning prevails with respect to a commodity like housing. 
Desert is not crucial to distribution in this sphere. Walzer believes that the outcome 
o f market exchanges do not give persons what they deserve. Thigpen (1984:148) 
says the following o f Walzer’s view:
M arket exchanges are based . .. on the expectation o f  each party that he or she will 
benefit from  the exchange. W ithout this expectation there can be no exchange. A 
person cannot deserve that others place the sam e values on a m arket exchange 
that he h im self does ... i f  desert w ere to be relevant to the m arket, it w ould be 
necessary to specify a  standard o f  work independent o f  w hat people w ant at a 
particular time. How ever, our [USA] understanding o f  the m arket forbids exactly 
such a standard o f  value.
So, what regulates participation in the market? Walzer thinks the principle o f equal 
citizenship must prevail. People are aliens in their own country if  they cannot buy 
goods at levels beyond what is necessary for bare subsistence. Commodities do not 
just have utility value -  they are also needed for standing and identity. To ensure 
participation a minimal income must therefore be guaranteed to all citizens, and 
minimal must be defined as “beyond what is necessary for bare subsistence”. 
Thigpen (1989:149) shows that again Walzer appeals to his notion o f  complex 
equality. “Complex equality emphasizes not that everyone should have the same 
amounts o f money and commodities, but that those who have more should not also 
control other social goods.” The appeal to complex equality, o f course, places the 
open market squarely within the ambit o f the common life. The common life -
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and, in particular, the right to equal participation in shaping the commonality, must 
be protected. This means that rights to participation in the market must be 
guaranteed. Complex equality would, o f course, allow for inequalities within 
spheres, but not for their multiplication across different spheres. The best way to 
deal with domination is through blocking cross-boundary monopolies.
Com plex equality m eans that no citizen’s standing in one sphere or w ith regard to 
one social good can be undercut by  his standing in some other sphere, with 
regard to som e other good. Thus, citizen x  m ay be chosen over citizen y  for 
political office, and then the two o f  them  will be unequal in the sphere o f  politics.
But they w ill not be unequal generally so long as x ’s office gives him  no 
advantages over y  in any other sphere -  superior m edical care, access to better 
schools for his children, entrepreneurial opportunities, and so on (W alzer, 
1983:19).
4. Shared understandings in South Africa: how deep do they 
run?
Land reform
In some spheres, particularly income, wealth, and commodities, there is a deep 
cleavage in the thinking o f South Africans which runs roughly along racial lines. 
Nozick’s entitlement theory of distribution is often quoted in defence of 
historically acquired advantage. In Anarchy, state and utopia (1974) Nozick 
argues that any person whose holdings were initially justly acquired, and justly 
transferred (to succeeding generations), must be deemed to be in possesion of just 
holdings. Holdings are initially justly acquired if their acquisition does not worsen 
the position o f  the non-beneficiaries and provided that the latter retain the 
opportunity to improve their position. Thus, it may be argued, the appropriation of 
unowned holdings -  such as the unexploited agricultural land o f  South Africa at 
the beginning o f the 19th century by whites, and the transfer o f these holdings 
largely by law o f inheritance, were just in the sense that no-one was left worse-off, 
i.e. enough land as good as that which had been appropriated was left for others, 
and an increase in their holdings was not made more difficult to obtain. However, 
the Land Act o f 1913 (amended in 1936) imposed statutary regulations affecting 
the freedom to own land in areas o f an individual’s choice, and assigned a 
disproportionally small area in total to blacks. This act had a direct impact not only 
on just acquisition, but also on just transfer (Klug, 1996:390-398). Blacks were 
made worse off, being unable both legally to improve their situation and to use and 
benefit from the land reserved for whites. So, though it may be argued that initial 
acquisition left no one worse off, after 1913 blacks in particular were not in the 
same situation as before. Redistribution, involving the transfer o f  land from whites 
to blacks, is therefore justified (Klug, 1996:398-401). Redistribution is a form of 
compensation, the aim being to raise those who have suffered injustice to the level 
before injust appropriations o f holdings occurred. To this end the ANC 
government has formulated several acts -  The Restitution o f Land Rights Act (No.
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22 o f 1994), The Labour Land Reform Tenants Act (No. 3 o f 1996), The 
Communual Property Association Act (No. 28 o f 1996) and The Interim 
Protection o f Informal Land Right Acts (No. 31 o f 1996).
Industrial reform
The South African situation is ridden by cross-cultural misrecognition and mis­
interpretation. On both sides o f the black-white divide perceptions o f the other as 
irreducibly “Other” require careful deconstruction. In the field o f  industry 
imploding the “partnership o f  the rider and the horse” -  as the partnership o f white 
capital and black labour have become known (Ngugi wa Thiongo, 1993:118) -  
would count as a great occasion worthy o f celebration, provided that it is 
celebrated by past beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike. In this context the 
problem o f redistribution is unlike the one obtaining in landholdings. The 
“struggle agenda” (James, 1997:127) focuses not on ownership of resources but 
rather on fair distribution o f  benefits. McNamara (1997:138-139) attributes the 
industrial unrest which has rocked South Africa since September 1973 -  “the first 
contemporary strike by black mineworkers at Western Deep Levels mine” -  to “a 
sense o f shared discontent and moral outrage” among black mineworkers. The 
roots o f  their discontent and outrage were threefold: Racial discrimination in jobs 
(McNamara, 1997:145, 150), wage differentials between black and white workers 
(McNamara, 1997:146,15), and the emergence o f  a “proletarianized” black 
workforce -  “men who no longer saw themselves as being tied to rural 
households, but were in their own view an industrial workforce” (McNamara, 
1997:148). It was this consciousness which enabled them successfully to mobilise 
protest action despite the presence o f unique institutional labour controls on the 
mines (McNamara, 1997:150-151). The underlying principle o f  protest, defined by 
Ted Gurr (1970:352) and quoted by McNamara (1997:150), has emerged as a 
principle o f  (re)distribution based on shared understandings among the 
proletarianized workers. “If the [White-Capitalistic] elite is committed to progress 
... the benefits o f  that progress should be evenly distributed. No group ... should 
gain less rapidly than others”.
Breaking down misrepresentations
At the cultural level imploding the demarcation between the West “and the rest o f  
us” (Ngugi wa Thiongo, 1993:141) which so easily translates to “the Whites and 
the rest o f  us” means two things: First, Africa must rescue itself from its 
Dickensonian “Please Sir, can I have some more”-Third World posture (Ngugi wa 
Thiongo, 1993:136). Second, “Out o f Africa”-Whites must educate themselves to 
humane sensibilities -  “What I learned from the game o f the country was useful to 
me with my dealings with the native people” (Ngugi wa Thiongo, 1993:134 
quoting Karen Blixen). Ngugi attacks the internalization o f a projected image, 
“What is ... often officially paraded as authentic African culture today is virtually a 
repeat o f the colonial tradition ... acrobatic contortions emptied o f the content o f  
struggle” (Ngugi wa Thiongo, 1993:27). Appiah (1992:72) echoes this sentiment.
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I ... w orry about our entrancem ent with the polarities o f  identity and difference; 
partly because the rhetoric o f  alterity has too often m eant the evacuation of 
specificity; partly because too m any African intellectuals, captivated by  this 
W estern them atic, seek to fashion them selves as the (im age o f  the) Other. W e run 
the risk o f  an ersatz exoticism, like the tourist trinkets in the Gifte Shoppes o f  
Lagos and Nairobi.
Deconstruction would involve re-educating formally colonised peoples to the 
pitfalls o f over-valuing cultural artefacts coming from their erstwhile colonial 
masters (Wiredu & Gyekye, 1992:62), and erstwhile masters learning that African- 
ness has less to do with a landmass and black skins than with people (Ki-Zerbo, 
1975:61). Gyekye (1997:158) asks what the source o f cross-cultural misrecog- 
nition is, and explains as follows:
I f  one w ere to look for a  pervasive and fundam ental concept in African 
socioethical thought generally -  a concept that anim ates other intellectual ties and 
form s o f  behaviour ... and provides continuity, resilience, nourishm ent and 
m eaning to  life -  that concept w ould m ost probably be hum anism : a  philosophy 
that sees hum an needs, interests, and dignity as o f  fundam ental im portance and 
concern.
The “partnership o f the rider and the horse”-phenomenon is due to the failure of 
“technology transfer” to become “technology transplant” (Gyekye, 1997:285). 
Humanism, “the basis o f African morality” (Gyekye, 1997:259) is the cause 
o f Africa’s pre-modem condition. “Technologicalization” (Gyekye, 1997:289) 
should be possible without its loss: the aim should be to remould society in such a 
manner that “the humanism o f traditional African life reasserts itself in a modem 
technical community” (Gyekye, 1997:159).
Neo-colonialism: Africa’s millstone
But, even as African philosophers1 view humanism as a counterbalance to Africa’s 
structural dependence on a market-oriented West -  as a platform for the advocacy 
o f Afrocentrism -  perceptions elsewhere decree that independence was cruelly 
limited in its effects: it narrowly privileged only the economic interests o f the 
political class who effected liberation (Lazarus, 1995:12-13). Ngugi, says Lazarus 
(1995:19-20), lays the blame for the West’s prevailing Afro-pessimism before the 
failed attempts o f “the African bourgeoisie to give meaningful freedom and 
independence to the broad masses o f the people”. Ngugi’s picture o f Africa, o f a 
community struggling against a legacy o f “colonial neglect and despoilation, post­
colonial mismanagement and venality” (Lazarus, 1995:22), sees the contemporary 
African middle-class as the domestic arm o f European neo-colonialism; it praises 
the horse, not its riders.
1 See Gyekye, (1997) and Wiredu (1996).
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Like other postcolonial nativist writers, Ngugi continues to identify capitalism in 
Africa with neo-colonialism. Redistribution cannot be left to the open market, 
because the market favours those who already have the advantages. Money does 
not loose its colonising power, nor its class-specificity -  money and its 
concommittant social power differentiations translate all too easily into political 
power -  it is the root o f  a self-reproducing class system. Social control is nurtured 
in a class-governed model o f society that detaches notions like equality from its 
determining material situations -  in particular, situations o f disadvantage which 
have grown up in the wake o f colonialism. So detached, the idea o f  equal 
treatment (in the sense o f  all having equality o f  opportunity) becomes a means of 
justifying the specifics o f a social stratification: as long as all are treated equally, 
the material speficities o f social inequality appear to be legitimate because such 
inequality is perceived to be a consequence o f the play o f  “fair rules” (i.e. rules 
which permit material inequality to grow alongside a formal legal equality). As a 
strategy for overcoming the social control exercised by capitalist, class-governed 
systems, moral categories o f  thought -  equality, freedom and rights -  should 
firmly be contextualised in the material circumstances o f social life, and the 
meanings attached to them should be ones constructed in democratic discourses 
based on those circumstances. Understanding the real worth o f each moral 
category is the first step in a remedial strategy which must remain open-ended: the 
social meanings o f these categories must never be limited simply for the sake of 
social control.
Shared understandings in South Africa: myth or reality?
How does Walzer cope with cleavages o f this kind and intensity in South Africa? 
Ingram (1995:139) sums up Walzer’s view thus: “Walzer’s point ... [is] that prior 
to any differences in opinion there are deeper, shared commitments to standards of 
justice”. According to Ingram, Walzer denies that there can be conflicting 
interpretations o f these deeper understandings because “Walzer’s [interpretation] 
is based on a historical [approach]” (Ingram, 1995:139). Ingram (1995:139), 
however, argues that in Walzer’s scheme o f things “anticipation o f  meaning is 
itself incomplete, and remains relative to different contexts o f  interpretation 
(Ingram’s emphasis). If correct there are no “deeper, shared commitments” o f the 
kind Walzer supposes -  only conflicts o f interpretation about these commitments. 
The crucial point is, as Ingram (1995:139) notes, that neither a “context-present- 
time-slice” nor an “historical narrative” which Walzer favours, can yield 
determinate answers. Ingram (1995:140) warns that appeal to some “all- 
encompassing, theoretical account o f justice beyond the conflicting, sphere- 
immanent accounts circulating in ‘our’ common understanding” tends to suppress 
both the sources of, and the different interpretations themselves o f particular 
shared understandings. For instance though Nozick’s theory throws some light on 
the South African problem, it is opposed to redistributions, treating them as 
instances o f patterned distributions o f the kind Walzer favours for distinct spheres. 
Patterned distributions necessitate redistribution whenever an existing distribution
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fails to conform to the predetermined pattern. Any system o f justice and rights will 
generate patterned distributions in accordance with the provisions o f the system in 
question. Nozick (1974:159-160) however, believes that social goods “come into 
the world already attached to people having entitlements over them”, and, if 
initially justly acquired and justly transferred -  according to the criteria Nozick 
favours -  they are entitled to their holdings. At bottom Nozick’s theory works on 
the principle o f first come -  first served (Cohen, 1986:129), a principle which fails 
to reckon with the cause o f the problem in South Africa -  viz, the exclusive 
membership policies o f successive governments.
Yet South Africa needs historically-based, deep, shared understandings. It is a 
society which cannot afford to be politically divided because o f economic 
interdependence. This fact had strengthened the hand o f black “protest strategy” 
and had set in motion a process o f  “structuration” -  o f re-organizing the physical 
world o f work and using it as a “habitus of power” capable o f  challenging the 
white-imposed structure o f rules (McNamara, 1997:152). McNamara (1997:151) 
notes that mining “spawned an egalitarian work culture, best summarized by the 
worker phrase ‘everyone gets dirty underground’, which challenges the idea that 
some underground workers should enjoy more rewards than others”. This 
“habitus” o f egalitarianism “derived from peoples’ conditions o f experiences and 
position in the division o f labour” (McNamara, 1997:151) offers a starting point 
for an understanding in the economic sphere -  one which accords with a model 
for the political sphere which Walzer favours. Walzer (1997:12) recommends a 
model o f the state without a dominanant cultural majority which he calls the 
“immigrant” society. An immigrant society has no majority and therefore no 
minorities -  there is no group whose culture is the official culture and whose 
language is the national language. However, successful parallel coexistence of 
communities with distinct beliefs, values and practices is premissed on shared 
social meanings and a public history, things requiring treatment which makes it 
legitimate “to tell stories about the history o f  diversity and to celebrate its great 
occasions” (Walzer, 1997:37). The immigrant model makes it possible for every 
constituency to share the public sphere on equal terms -  and to tell their own 
versions o f the national history.
The voices “coming out o f centres outside Europe” (Cantalupa, 1995:210 quoting 
Ngugf 1993) speak o f structures o f “domination and subjugation” (Cantalupa, 
1995:224) o f peoples’ “lack o f  empowerment” (Cantalupa, 1995:212) and of 
desires for “moving towards a pluralism o f cultures, literatures and languages” 
(N gugf’ 1993:10) and wanting to understand “all the voices coming from what is 
essentially a plurality o f centres all over the world” (N gugf’ , 1993:11). It is to­
wards this vision that the struggle for recognition is directed. These are some of 
the dominant voices being heard in South Africa today. They conflict with voices
-  Nozickian in tone -  coming from less numerous but still powerful interest 
groups intent on resisting redistribution.
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